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A number of recent articles have used different financial market instruments to measure near-term ex-
pectations of the federal funds rate and the high-frequency changes in these instruments around Federal
Open Market Committee announcements to measure monetary policy shocks. This article evaluates the
empirical success of a variety of financial market instruments in predicting the future path of monetary
policy. All of the instruments we consider provide forecasts that are clearly superior to those of standard
time series models at all of the horizons considered. Among financial market instruments, we find that
federal funds futures dominate all the other securities in forecasting monetary policy at horizons out to six
months. For longer horizons, the predictive power of many of the instruments we consider is very similar.
In addition, we present evidence that monetary policy shocks computed using the current-month federal
funds futures contract are influenced by changes in the timing of policy actions that do not influence the
expected course of policy beyond a horizon of about six weeks. We propose an alternative shock measure
that captures changes in market expectations of policy over slightly longer horizons.
KEY WORDS: Federal Reserve; Futures; Monetary policy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Measures of monetary policy expectations are an important
element of many empirical articles in the macroeconomics and
finance literatures. Lately, a strand of literature has focused on
measuring policy expectations from asset prices. In this con-
text, market interest rates have often been used to parse out
the unexpected component of policy decisions—often referred
to as monetary policy shocks. Krueger and Kuttner (1996),
Rudebusch (1998), and Brunner (2000) were among the first
to explore this approach, and many others have subsequently
followed their lead.
An important issue in this approach is the choice of the as-
set to be used in measuring expectations. The abundance of
short-term interest rates that potentially measure federal funds
rate expectations has led to a proliferation of asset price–
based monetary policy expectation measures, many times with
an assertion that a particular measure is better than others
with little evidence offered in support. Kuttner (2001) and
Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) used the current-month
federal funds futures contract, Bomfim (2003) and Poole and
Rasche (2000) the month-ahead federal funds futures contract,
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) the one-month eurodollar deposit
rate, Ellingsen and Soderstrom (2004) the three-month Trea-
sury bill rate, and Rigobon and Sack (2002) the three-month
eurodollar futures rate.
This article evaluates the ability of these and other financial
market instruments to capture expectations of the future course
of monetary policy and, correspondingly, to measure mone-
tary policy shocks. Each of the financial market instruments
we consider—term federal funds loans, federal funds futures,
term eurodollar deposits, eurodollar futures, Treasury bills, and
commercial paper—differ with respect to their risk and liquidity
characteristics, so that it is not clear a priori which should pro-
vide the best forecast of the future course of monetary policy.
For example, U.S. Treasury bills are regarded by market par-
ticipants as being the safest and among the most liquid of the
instruments in our study. Nonetheless, they may not be the best
measure of monetary policy expectations because the price that
investors are willing to pay for safety and liquidity may vary
over time. The same kinds of problems arise with our other se-
curities, which tend to be riskier and less liquid than Treasury
bills. In this article, we perform a comprehensive set of empir-
ical tests to determine which financial market instrument—or
combination of instruments—forecasts the federal funds rate
the best at various horizons. Those instruments that have the
highest predictive power for the federal funds rate are taken to
be the best measures of monetary policy expectations.
We find that all of the financial market instruments in our
study provide forecasts that are clearly superior to those of stan-
dard time series models, such as a Bayesian VAR. Among our
financial market securities, federal funds futures dominate all
other securities for predicting changes in the federal funds rate
at horizons out to six months. For longer forecast horizons, we
find that, perhaps surprisingly, the predictive power of many of
the instruments we consider is very similar. Even at these longer
horizons, though, the predictive power of these financial mar-
ket instruments is substantial, with R2 of about 40% for federal
funds rate changes.
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The superior forecasting performance of federal funds fu-
tures may, in part, reflect that they are explicitly linked to the
federal funds rate. However, an explicit link does not necessar-
ily imply that these instruments will provide better forecasts.
For example, to the extent that federal funds futures are less liq-
uid than other securities, then the forecasts they provide might
be expected to perform more poorly, because of the wedges
introduced by larger transaction costs (bid–ask spreads, “slip-
page” of price against large orders) and the greater risks asso-
ciated with being unable to adjust or unwind a position quickly
in response to incoming news. This was arguably the case both
for Consumer Price Index (CPI) futures in the 1980s (which
were introduced on the Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange
in June 1985 but were delisted in April 1987 because of ex-
tremely low trading volumes and open interest) and for Trea-
sury inflation-indexed securities (TIPS) in the first few years
after their introduction in 1997: Despite being explicitly linked
to CPI inflation, both securities were generally regarded as pro-
viding poor measures of inflation expectations due, in part, to
their low level of liquidity. Moreover, even though the other in-
struments we consider are not explicitly linked to the federal
funds rate, they are extremely close substitutes, so that the link-
age to federal funds rate expectations should be very tight. This
makes them prime candidates for improving or even dominat-
ing forecasts based on federal funds futures alone.
Our results have important implications for market-based
measures of monetary policy shocks, or the surprise compo-
nent of monetary policy announcements. In many of the arti-
cles using market-based measures of policy expectations, policy
shocks are measured by revisions to near-term expectations of
the federal funds rate at the time of policy decisions. Based on
our findings, it appears that the best measure of shocks to the
immediate policy setting would be based on federal funds fu-
tures rates, as in the approach described by Kuttner (2001).
One potential shortcoming of such a measure, as also dis-
cussed by Kuttner (2001), is that shocks to the immediate pol-
icy setting can be influenced by shifts in the timing of policy
actions that have little consequence for the expected course of
monetary policy beyond the horizon of a few weeks. Such pol-
icy surprises would presumably have limited effects on asset
prices or the economy. We, therefore, compute an alternative
measure of policy shocks based on the rates on federal funds
and eurodollar futures with slightly longer horizons. This new
measure captures changes to the expected near-term policy path
rather than to the immediate policy setting, and, hence, it is less
influenced by the timing of policy actions.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2
provides an introduction to each of our financial market instru-
ments and discusses its risk, liquidity, and available maturities.
Section 3 derives our estimation framework and discusses the
methodology. Section 4 estimates the forecasting power of each
of our financial market instruments for the federal funds rate
and the estimated average risk premium for each instrument. It
also shows that the predictive power of the financial instruments
clearly dominates that of a Bayesian VAR. Section 5 traces out
the implications of these results for the measurement of mon-
etary policy shocks and suggests an alternative shock measure
that is less susceptible to surprises in the exact timing of FOMC
decisions. Section 6 concludes. A technical appendix provides
details of our benchmark Bayesian VAR estimation and fore-
casting methodology.
2. DATA
Expectations about the near-term course of monetary pol-
icy are an important determinant of most short-term market
interest rates. This relationship is very explicit in some cases,
such as for federal funds futures, which are contracts where
the payout on the instrument is directly linked to the realized
level of the federal funds rate. In other cases, the relationship
arises because investors can substitute between different strate-
gies for obtaining short-term returns. In this section, we review
a number of market interest rates that could be used to measure
monetary policy expectations. The discussion touches on char-
acteristics of the underlying instruments that might influence
their information content, including the liquidity of the instru-
ments and the potential size of the risk premia that also influ-
ence these rates. For additional details, see the data appendix in
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2006) and Stigum (1990).
Term Federal Funds Loans. The federal funds rate—the
policy instrument of the Federal Reserve—is the rate at which
banks make unsecured loans to one another on an overnight
basis. But banks can also borrow and lend to one another for
longer periods in the federal funds market, called term federal
funds loans. Because these loans are unsecured, they are among
the riskier instruments we consider—and, hence, they may em-
bed a larger credit risk premium than that found in overnight
federal funds loans. The market for loans with maturities of up
to six months is reasonably active and liquid (though nowhere
near the levels for the overnight federal funds market), but there
is virtually no activity beyond that horizon.
Federal Funds Futures. These futures contracts, traded on
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) exchange, have a payout at
maturity based on the average effective federal funds rate that is
realized for the calendar month specified in the contract. Thus,
the price of these securities is closely linked to financial market
expectations for the average federal funds rate for the month
in question. The counterparty credit risk in these instruments
is relatively small due to the CBOT’s daily marking-to-market
and collateral requirements. Over most of our sample, federal
funds futures contracts were extremely liquid at expirations out
to three months and still fairly liquid out to five or six months,
but liquidity dropped off sharply at horizons beyond that. How-
ever, in the past few years, liquidity and open interest in federal
funds futures has soared, with significant liquidity extending
out even to nine or ten months.
Term Eurodollar Deposits. Term eurodollars are dollar-
denominated time deposits held at financial institutions outside
the United States, particularly London. As with term federal
funds, these loans are unsecured and, thus, suffer from some
probability of default. Moreover, the set of participants in the
eurodollar market may differ in credit quality from those in the
term federal funds market, which could potentially drive an ad-
ditional wedge between eurodollar rates and the correspond-
ing term federal funds rates. Nevertheless, many large banks
do actively substitute between domestic deposits and eurodol-
lar deposits, suggesting that the linkage is fairly tight. Eurodol-
lar deposit maturities range from overnight to several years,
although volumes fall off considerably after one year—indeed,
the British Bankers Association does not provide quotes for
eurodollar deposit rates [or London Interbank Offered Rates
(LIBOR)] for maturities longer than one year.
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Eurodollar Futures. These futures contracts, traded on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), are the most actively
traded futures contracts in the world. They have a payout at ma-
turity based on the spot three-month LIBOR on the day of ex-
piration. As with federal funds futures, the counterparty credit
risk is relatively small due to daily marking-to-market and col-
lateral requirements. Quarterly contracts are available out to
horizons of 10 years, and liquidity is exceptionally high for con-
tracts expiring over the first several years. Of course, the value
of these contracts is directly tied to LIBOR rather than to the
federal funds rate, and, hence, the success of these contracts for
predicting U.S. monetary policy depends, as with term eurodol-
lars, on the extent to which LIBOR tracks the federal funds rate
in the markets.
Treasury Bills. U.S. Treasury bills are among the safest
and most liquid securities in the world. At various times, the
U.S. Treasury has issued bills with maturities ranging anywhere
from one month to one year, but it has only consistently offered
three-month and six-month securities over our sample period.
Treasury bills are viewed as being essentially free of default
risk and have some tax advantages (they are not taxed at the
state level), whereas the federal funds rate is a private short-
term interest rate that has some default risk and no tax advan-
tages, which introduces a potential shortcoming of bill rates as
a predictor of future federal funds rates. Nevertheless, substitu-
tion between these short-term rates is extensive and the linkage
between them is thought to be very tight.
Commercial Paper. Commercial paper (CP) is unsecured
debt with maturity shorter than 270 days issued by investment-
grade corporations. We only consider the highest-grade (A1/P1)
class of commercial paper in our analysis. As with term federal
funds and eurodollars, these loans are subject to some probabil-
ity of default, but default is less likely for CP because issuers
are typically required to have a committed line of credit from
a major financial institution that can be used to repay lenders
in an emergency. CP issuance is concentrated at maturities of
less than 90 days, with an average maturity of around 30 days.
The linkage between CP and federal funds arises because in-
vestors can substitute between holding CP and making federal
funds loans (or holding other short-term assets whose rates are
influenced by the federal funds rate).
3. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
The ability of investors to substitute between different finan-
cial market instruments suggests, as does standard asset pricing
theory, that the rate of return rmt,t+k on a market instrument m
from day t to day t + k is equal to the expected rate of return
from an investment strategy of rolling over overnight loans in
the federal funds market from day t to day t + k, plus a risk
premium ρmt,t+k:
rmt,t+k = Et
[
t+k−1∏
j=t
(1 + ffj) − 1
]
+ ρmt,t+k, (1)
where ff j is the overnight federal funds rate on day j. One may
derive (1) directly from standard asset pricing theory—see, for
example, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) for a general
analysis and Gürkaynak et al. (2002) for a specific derivation.
We rearrange terms in (1) to arrive at the following regression
equation:
f̄f t,t+k = α + βrmt,t+k + εt, (2)
where, to simplify notation, we let f̄f t,t+k = [
∏t+k−1
j=t (1 +
ffj) − 1] denote the (compounded) return to the strategy of
rolling over federal funds loans and where the risk pre-
mium ρmt,t+k has been included in the regression residual (with
its average level incorporated into the constant). Note that the
risk premium, which is measured in (1) and (2) relative to the
federal funds rate, can, in principle, be negative for some assets,
a possibility that we will confirm empirically for Treasury bills
later.
Equation (2) is a standard interest rate forecasting regression
that has been widely used in the literature. We will be inter-
ested, in particular, in the R2 and root mean squared forecast
error (RMSE) from regression (2), as these directly measure
the usefulness of our various financial market instruments for
forecasting the federal funds rate.
A common assumption in the literature, referred to as the
“expectations hypothesis,” is that the risk premium ρmt,t+k is
constant over time and, thus, depends only on the security m and
its maturity k. We do not require this assumption for this article,
because we are interested in the forecasting performance of re-
gression (2) rather than structural estimates of β . To the extent
that the risk premium ρmt,t+k on security m varies over time, it
will deteriorate the forecasting performance of security m in re-
gression (2) (and tend to lead to an estimate of β that is different
from unity to the extent that ρmt,t+k is correlated with r
m
t,t+k) and
cause us to favor other financial market instruments for fore-
casting the federal funds rate. Thus, we will naturally be led to
favor instruments for which time-varying risk premia are less of
an issue. Finally, if we impose β = 1 in regression (2), then the
estimated value of α will be −ρ, the (negative of the) average
risk premium on the asset, which we will also report for each
financial market instrument.
Two final issues arise in estimating (2). First, some of the
instruments we consider are term interest rates (term federal
funds, eurodollar deposits, Treasury bills, commercial paper),
whereas others are futures rates (federal funds futures, eurodol-
lar futures), which forecast the federal funds rate starting at
some future date t + j. To be able to make direct comparisons
across the various instruments we consider, we back out the im-
plied forward rates from all of our term interest rates and com-
pare the predictive power across instruments in terms of their
forward rate predictions, as follows. Let rmt,t+j,t+j+k denote the
implied interest rate on security m on date t for a loan beginning
on day t + j and ending on day t + j + k. A simple modification
of the preceding analysis yields the regression equation:
f̄f t+j,t+j+k = α + βrmt,t+j,t+k + εt. (3)
The second issue that arises in estimating (3) is that if the
nominal rates of return in the equation are integrated variables
(or nearly so), the estimated coefficients will be dominated by
their long-run relationship (the cointegrating vector), regardless
of their short-run relationships. Because we are primarily inter-
ested in their short-run relationships—that is, in the ability of
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market rates to predict the federal funds rate over the next sev-
eral months or quarters—we follow common practice and “sto-
chastically detrend” (2) by subtracting off the current level of
the federal funds rate from both sides of the equation:
f̄f t+j,t+j+k − ff t = α + β(rmt,t+j,t+k − ff t) + εt. (4)
Equation (4) serves as the basis for all of the empirical work
that follows. Each regression also includes two dummy vari-
ables to capture potential systematic spikes in risk premia:
a Y2K dummy variable that is nonzero for the forward rate
spanning the century date change and a year-end dummy vari-
able that is nonzero for forward rates spanning the end of any
year. The year-end dummy is included because firms sometimes
attempt to make their year-end balance sheets look stronger for
reporting purposes (they engage in “window dressing”); as a re-
sult, firms as a whole may be more willing to hold some as-
sets than others over the year end, which can affect their prices.
(Downing and Oliner 2004 showed that year-end effects are par-
ticularly important for commercial paper.)
4. THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF FINANCIAL
MARKET INSTRUMENTS
We now apply regression specification (4) to our various fi-
nancial market instruments. We begin our sample in 1994, be-
cause the FOMC (the Federal Open Market Committee, which
is the policymaking body of the Federal Reserve) began ex-
plicitly announcing its target for the federal funds rate at that
time, and, thus, there is a potential structural break in financial
market forecasting performance beginning with that date. We
consider forecast horizons for each security ranging from one
month ahead to four quarters ahead, although data availability
prevent us from considering some forecast horizons for some
securities (as discussed in Sec. 2). The horizons considered for
each instrument are summarized in Table 1.
4.1 Results for Monthly Frequency Instruments
We perform our first set of regressions at a monthly fre-
quency (sampling on the next-to-last business day of each
month), computing one-month forward rates for horizons rang-
ing from one to six months ahead. Unfortunately, eurodollar fu-
tures have quarterly expiration dates and our Treasury bill data
include only quarterly maturities, so we must exclude these two
instruments in this first round.
Table 1. Data Description
Instrument Horizon covered
Term federal funds loans 1–12 months
Federal funds futures 1–6 months
Term eurodollar deposits 1–12 months
Eurodollar futures 1–4 quarters
Treasury bills 1–2 quarters
Commercial paper 1–3 months
NOTE: Data for federal funds futures are from CBOT, eurodollar futures from CME, term
federal funds from Bloomberg, term eurodollar deposits from the British Bankers Association,
constant-maturity Treasury Bills from the U.S. Treasury Department, and commercial paper from
the Federal Reserve’s H.15 data release. Before 1997, the commercial paper data are based
on a survey of dealers. See text and the data appendix in Gürkaynak et al. (2006) for additional
details.
The performance of each of our financial market instruments
in forecasting the federal funds rate is reported in Table 2 and
summarized in Figure 1. The figure plots the RMSE [Fig. 1(a)]
and R2 [Fig. 1(b)] from regression (4) as a function of the hori-
zon considered, with each line corresponding to a different mar-
ket instrument. Overall, the ability of all of the securities to
predict the federal funds rate is remarkable, with R2 statistics
often falling in the 60–75% range. (All the instruments have a
higher R2 statistic at a two-month horizon than at a one-month
horizon. This is due to the fact that there is little systematic
variation in the dependent variable to explain at a horizon of
only one month—indeed, the next policy meeting is a full three
weeks away on average. The RMSE is strictly increasing with
the length of the forecast horizon for all of our instruments, as
one would expect.)
Our results also indicate that federal funds futures dominate
all of our other financial market instruments in predicting the
federal funds rate at all horizons, with the difference being the
most striking at horizons of one to two months. We interpret this
result as suggesting that federal funds futures provide the best
market-based measure of monetary policy expectations at hori-
zons out to six months. Of the remaining three financial mar-
ket instruments, term federal funds and term eurodollars have
very similar forecasting performance, whereas commercial pa-
per forecasts better than these two at a horizon of one month,
about equally at a horizon of two months, and worse at a hori-
zon of three months.
Our findings of a high R2 for financial market forecasts at
all horizons seems at odds with Rudebusch (2002), who re-
ported that R2 falls to 0 rapidly with the forecast horizon.
There are two reasons for this discrepancy: First, our sam-
ple period (1994–2004) is one in which the federal funds rate
was generally easier to forecast (Lange, Sack, and Whitesell
2003; Swanson 2005) than the late 1980s and early 1990s,
which make up a large part of Rudebusch’s sample. Second,
Rudebusch forecasts forward monthly changes in the federal
funds rate (i.e., from month t + n − 1 to t + n) and reports R2
values for those changes, whereas we report R2 values for the
cumulative change in the funds rate from month t to t + n, as
in (4). This latter measure corresponds as closely as possible to
the markets’ ability to forecast the funds rate itself in n months’
time.
As a benchmark for comparison, the bottom rows of Table 2
report analogous results for a set of Bayesian VAR (BVAR)
forecasts of the federal funds rate. The BVAR is based on
12 monthly lags of the funds rate, nonfarm payrolls, and the
core CPI, with a prior taken from Robertson and Tallman (2001)
and Sims and Zha (1998) that shrinks the coefficients toward
independent random walks, toward unit roots more generally,
and toward cointegration. As discussed by Sims (1992) and
Sims and Zha (1998), Bayesian VARs of this type typically
provide superior forecasts of macroeconomic time series rela-
tive to standard VARs due to problems of overparameterization
and overfitting associated with the latter. To make the time se-
ries forecasts as comparable to our financial market forecasts
as possible, we use real-time vintage data and real-time (i.e.,
recursive) estimation of the BVAR at each date t. Additional
details of the data, estimation, and forecasting methodology for
our BVAR are provided in the Appendix.
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Table 2. Monthly Regressions [f̄f t+j , t+j+k − ff t = α + β(rmt, t+j , t+j+k − ff t ) + εt ]
α β RMSE (bp) R2 p value, H0: β = 1
Average risk premium (bp),
β = 1 imposed
Term federal funds
One-month −.019 (−.74) .69 (8.16) 13.1 .52 .00 10.2 (9.03)
Two-month −.141 (−3.29) .93 (10.04) 19.3 .65 .43 16.9 (7.21)
Three-month −.242 (−3.30) 1.00 (8.01) 25.7 .69 .97 24.0 (6.75)
Four-month −.315 (−2.89) 1.12 (6.29) 36.2 .64 .49 25.0 (4.47)
Five-month −.390 (−2.61) 1.12 (5.84) 46.1 .60 .54 31.2 (4.08)
Six-month −.432 (−2.00) 1.04 (4.00) 59.2 .51 .87 40.1 (3.37)
Federal funds futures
One-month −.016 (−1.38) .94 (17.86) 9.1 .73 .24 2.6 (3.13)
Two-month −.077 (−2.51) 1.06 (12.05) 15.6 .75 .51 6.1 (3.23)
Three-month −.124 (−2.20) 1.11 (8.75) 24.2 .71 .40 8.6 (2.47)
Four-month −.177 (−2.02) 1.14 (6.79) 34.5 .66 .41 12.1 (2.23)
Five-month −.240 (−1.86) 1.14 (5.58) 45.0 .60 .50 17.2 (2.15)
Six-month −.305 (−1.68) 1.12 (4.52) 56.6 .54 .64 23.7 (2.15)
Eurodollar deposits
One-month −.065 (−2.15) .77 (8.27) 13.0 .54 .01 13.3 (12.10)
Two-month −.195 (−4.06) .97 (9.86) 18.9 .66 .73 20.9 (9.14)
Three-month −.307 (−3.83) 1.07 (8.00) 25.8 .69 .61 27.1 (7.63)
Four-month −.367 (−3.08) 1.14 (6.32) 36.0 .64 .45 28.6 (5.26)
Five-month −.436 (−2.74) 1.14 (5.77) 46.1 .60 .47 33.5 (4.49)
Six-month −.460 (−2.14) 1.07 (4.17) 58.4 .52 .78 40.9 (3.59)
Commercial paper
One-month .013 (.74) .72 (11.35) 10.6 .63 .00 5.3 (5.94)
Two-month −.065 (−1.81) .90 (9.63) 18.5 .65 .28 9.7 (4.68)
Three-month −.145 (−1.94) .95 (6.47) 28.4 .61 .73 16.6 (3.92)
Bayesian VAR
One-month — — 16.9 .18 — —
Two-month — — 29.9 .20 — —
Three-month — — 42.2 .21 — —
Four-month — — 53.7 .21 — —
Five-month — — 65.1 .20 — —
Six-month — — 76.7 .17 — —
NOTE: Sample period: 1994:1–2004:12 at monthly frequency, sampled the next-to-last business day of the month; number of observations is 132 − n, where n is the forecast horizon in months.
t statistics are reported in parentheses and use Newey–West heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. The BVAR is estimated recursively from 1985:1 to each forecast
date t ; RMSE and R2 for the BVAR are for 1994:1–2004:12 and R2 is for changes from t to t + n, just as for the financial market–based forecasts. See text for details.
As can be seen in Table 2, all of the financial market–based
forecasts clearly outperform BVAR-based forecasts of the fed-
eral funds rate at all horizons. The RMSE statistics are 25–50%
lower, and the R2 values typically three times higher, for the fi-
nancial market–based forecasts relative to the BVAR forecasts.
(The R2 values for the BVAR are for changes in the funds rate
from time t to time t + n, just as for our financial market in-
struments. Note that a random walk would have an R2 of 0 by
this measure.) The superior predictive power of federal funds
futures has also been shown by Piazzesi and Swanson (2004),
relative to a random walk and AR(1) forecasts, and by Evans
(1998), relative to an estimated Taylor-type rule.
Of course, as discussed previously, the financial instruments
contain risk premia that can drive a wedge between their prices
and funds rate expectations. The estimated average risk pre-
mium at each horizon for each instrument is reported in Ta-
ble 2 and graphed in Figure 1. For many of these instruments,
the estimated average risk premia are fairly large, amounting to
almost 10 basic points (bp) per month for term federal funds
and term eurodollar deposits. The premia on these last two in-
struments, in particular, may largely reflect compensation for
the risk of counterparty default—indeed, federal funds futures,
which are virtually free of counterparty risk, have by far the
smallest risk premia of all the financial market instruments in
the table. We do not take a stand in this article on the source
of the remaining estimated risk premia in federal funds futures
(Piazzesi and Swanson 2004 discuss the issue in more detail).
We do note, however, that the generally falling level of interest
rates over our sample raises the possibility that market partici-
pants overpredicted the funds rate on average, and that any such
error would boost the measured risk premia.
Note, too, that the hypothesis that β = 1, which we impose
to estimate the risk premia, is generally not rejected for any of
our securities, except at the one-month-ahead horizon for secu-
rities other than federal funds futures. Although time-varying
risk premia may be a factor in the poorer forecasting perfor-
mance of term federal fund loans, term eurodollar deposits, and
commercial paper relative to federal funds futures, our results
suggest that this variation is not correlated enough with (or large
enough relative to) the interest rate spreads on the right side
of (4) to drive our estimated coefficients very far from unity.
In Table 3 we investigate to what extent a linear combina-
tion of our four financial market instruments might outperform
federal funds futures by placing all four financial market in-
struments on the right side of regression (4). At all horizons,
only the federal funds futures rate is ever significant, suggesting
that the other securities have little, if any, additional predictive
power. In the bottom panel of the table, for each instrument we
perform an “encompassing” test of the joint hypothesis that the
coefficients on all the other securities are 0. As is evident from
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1. Monthly Regressions. (a) Root mean squared error; (b) regression R2. ( federal funds futures; term federal funds;
eurodollar deposits; commercial paper.)
the table, we typically cannot reject the hypothesis that the fed-
eral funds futures rate encompasses all of the information con-
tained in the other instruments, whereas we typically do reject
the hypothesis that any of the other securities can stand on their
own. We also experimented with the methods for combining
forecasts described in Clemen and Winkler (1986) and could
not reject the hypothesis that federal funds futures performed
as well as those forecast combination measures. These results
lend additional support to our conclusion that federal funds fu-
tures dominate all of our other market-based measures of mon-
etary policy expectations (and the BVAR) at horizons out to six
months.
4.2 Results for Quarterly Frequency Instruments
Our second set of regressions considers instruments that fore-
cast quarterly averages of the federal funds rate at horizons ex-
tending out to one year. Of course, moving from monthly to
quarterly frequency decreases the number of observations in our
sample, but as noted previously, two of our financial market in-
struments (eurodollar futures and Treasury bills) cannot be used
to compute forecasts of the federal funds rate over anything
finer than a quarterly window. For these regressions, we sam-
ple the data on the next-to-last business day before the expira-
tion of eurodollar futures contracts (typically about two weeks
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Table 3. Forecasts Using Multiple Financial Market Instruments
(monthly regressions)
Horizon (months)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Coefficients
Term federal funds −.27 −.00 .31 .27 .43 .30
(−1.08) (−.00) (1.07) (.56) (1.29) (.81)
Federal funds futures 1.14 1.29 .85 .77 .48 .92
(7.13) (6.14) (3.04) (2.17) (1.42) (1.97)
Eurodollar deposits .06 −.13 .13 .10 .23 −.10
(.26) (−.49) (.53) (.19) (.46) (−.26)
Commercial paper .03 −.09 −.18 — — —
(.24) (−.51) (−1.28)
Encompassing tests (p value)
Term federal funds .000 .000 .002 .022 .014 .048
Federal funds futures .176 .650 .007 .621 .237 .662
Eurodollar deposits .000 .000 .000 .067 .071 .000
Commercial paper .000 .000 .000 — — —
NOTE: The note to Table 2 applies. Regressions include all four financial market instruments
on the right side. Encompassing tests are for the joint restriction that all other financial market
instruments in the regression have a zero coefficient.
before the end of the quarter), except for federal funds futures,
which we sample on the next-to-last business day of the quarter.
(Ideally, we would like to synchronize our federal funds futures
forecasts with our eurodollar futures forecasts, but this is not
possible because federal funds futures always expire at the end
of the month and eurodollar futures about two weeks before the
end of the quarter.)
Results are reported in Table 4 and summarized in Figure 2.
Again, all of our financial market instruments clearly dominate
Bayesian VAR–based forecasts of the federal funds rate, but this
time the forecasting performance across our various financial
instruments is more similar, with federal funds futures and term
federal funds performing the best at short horizons and term
federal funds, term eurodollars, and eurodollar futures all per-
forming about equally well at horizons of three or four quarters.
One might worry that this is because all of our instruments fore-
cast poorly at long horizons, but this is not the case—indeed, all
three instruments have R2 values of about 40% in regression (4),
which is substantial for a one-year-ahead forecast. Again, the
hypothesis that β = 1 is not rejected for any of our securities at
any horizon.
One interesting observation that emerges from the table is
that commercial paper and Treasury bills forecast relatively
poorly in the near term, despite the fact that they have among
the smallest average risk premia of all our financial market
instruments—indeed, the estimated average risk premium on
Treasury bills is highly negative at the one-quarter horizon, re-
flecting the tax advantages of these securities and a willing-
ness of investors to pay a premium for their unparalleled safety
and very high liquidity. This finding highlights the fact that a
smaller average risk premium and high liquidity do not neces-
sarily lead to better forecasting performance.
Table 5 presents results from multivariate forecasting regres-
sions with all of our financial market instruments except federal
Table 4. Quarterly regressions [f̄f t+j , t+j+k − ff t = α + β(rmt, t+j , t+j+k − ff t ) + εt ]
α β RMSE (bp) R2 p value, H0: β = 1
Average risk premium (bp),
β = 1 imposed
Term federal funds:
One-quarter −.129 (−3.67) 1.00 (11.64) 14.9 .82 .97 12.9 (5.71)
Two-quarter −.348 (−2.33) 1.08 (5.42) 42.8 .67 .70 30.6 (3.01)
Three-quarter −.555 (−1.68) 1.07 (3.46) 75.4 .52 .82 49.3 (2.61)
Four-quarter −.854 (−1.61) 1.04 (3.25) 107.3 .40 .90 79.5 (4.15)
Federal funds futures
One-quarter −.089 (−2.33) 1.07 (8.29) 14.4 .77 .59 7.2 (3.28)
Two-quarter −.264 (−1.88) 1.04 (4.72) 44.0 .61 .85 24.4 (2.87)
Eurodollar deposits
One-quarter −.235 (−2.97) 1.14 (7.09) 19.9 .67 .40 17.2 (6.43)
Two-quarter −.385 (−2.24) 1.08 (4.76) 46.5 .61 .74 33.8 (3.32)
Three-quarter −.621 (−1.65) 1.11 (3.11) 77.9 .49 .76 52.2 (2.60)
Four-quarter −.952 (−1.62) 1.09 (3.01) 107.0 .40 .80 81.0 (3.96)
Eurodollar futures
One-quarter −.231 (−2.98) 1.15 (7.19) 19.8 .69 .36 16.4 (6.46)
Two-quarter −.385 (−2.26) 1.10 (4.55) 46.1 .62 .67 32.6 (3.20)
Three-quarter −.588 (−1.57) 1.06 (2.95) 78.9 .48 .87 53.7 (2.53)
Four-quarter −.897 (−1.55) 1.05 (2.92) 108.3 .39 .90 82.7 (3.88)
Commercial paper
One-quarter −.109 (−1.77) .894 (5.09) 21.2 .58 .55 13.9 (4.16)
Treasury bills
One-quarter .240 (4.85) .78 (4.67) 28.2 .33 .20 −23.7 (−4.80)
Two-quarter −.082 (−.70) 1.02 (4.81) 45.8 .61 .93 7.7 (.74)
Bayesian VAR
One-quarter — — 47.2 .00 — —
Two-quarter — — 85.7 .00 — —
Three-quarter — — 110.0 .13 — —
Four-quarter — — 132.2 .19 — —
NOTE: Sample period: 1994:1–2004:4 at quarterly frequency, sampled the next-to-last business day before the expiration of eurodollar futures (about two weeks before the end of the quarter),
except for federal funds futures, which are sampled the next-to-last business day of the quarter; number of observations is 44−n, where n is the forecast horizon in quarters. t statistics are reported
in parentheses and use Newey–West heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. The BVAR is estimated recursively from 1985:1 to each forecast date t ; RMSE and R2 for
the BVAR are for 1994:1–2004:4 and R2 is for changes from t to t + n, just as for the financial market–based forecasts. See text for details.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2. Quarterly Regressions. (a) Root mean squared error; (b) regression R2. ( federal funds futures; term federal funds;
eurodollar deposits; eurodollar futures; treasury bills.)
funds futures on the right side (we omit federal funds futures be-
cause we are not able to sample them on the same day with the
same horizon as eurodollar futures and the other instruments).
In general, no one instrument stands out as dominating or con-
sistently encompassing the others. Although term federal funds
rates fare a bit better in the encompassing tests, at the four-
quarter-ahead horizon we still cannot reject the hypothesis that
any of the three available instruments is a sufficient statistic for
the other two. This finding may reflect a stronger tendency of
financial markets to price these securities off of one another at
longer maturities. Finally, the optimal linear combination of the
securities varies dramatically from one column of the table to
the next, suggesting that none of these estimated linear combi-
nations will provide forecasts of the federal funds rate that are
very robust. Going forward, then, one is probably best advised
to use one of these instruments—or at most a simple average of
two or three of them—for measuring monetary policy expecta-
tions at longer horizons.
5. MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS
The results in the previous section indicate that federal funds
futures provide useful measures of monetary policy expec-
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Table 5. Forecasts Using Multiple Financial Market Instruments
(quarterly regressions)
Horizon (quarters)
1 2 3 4
Coefficients
Term federal funds 1.17 1.82 1.41 .27
(13.98) (5.91) (2.38) (.24)
Eurodollar deposits −.76 −3.82 −.52 .46
(−.59) (−3.18) (−.46) (.23)
Eurodollar futures 1.09 2.53 .15 .33
(.88) (2.26) (.19) (.18)
Treasury bills .35 .47 — —
(3.18) (.92)
Commercial paper −.73 — — —
(−2.22)
Encompassing tests (p value)
Term federal funds .002 .010 .893 .834
Eurodollar deposits .000 .000 .054 .943
Eurodollar futures .000 .000 .011 .915
Treasury bills .000 .000 — —
Commercial paper .000 — — —
NOTE: The note to Table 4 applies. Regressions include all four financial market instruments
on the right side. Encompassing tests are for the joint restriction that all other financial market
instruments in the regression have a zero coefficient.
tations. However, in many applications one is interested in
changes in policy expectations, such as around FOMC an-
nouncements or macroeconomic data releases. Indeed, as noted
in Section 1, changes in market-based measures of monetary
policy expectations around FOMC announcements have been
used by a number of authors as measures of monetary policy
shocks (e.g., Faust et al. 2004 discussed how the surprise com-
ponent of monetary policy announcements can be used to help
identify the effects of monetary policy shocks in a VAR). In
this section, we discuss how to measure the surprise compo-
nent of monetary policy announcements using federal funds fu-
tures, given that we found these rates provide the best measure
of near-term monetary policy expectations.
A small complication that arises with federal funds futures
is that these rates are based on the average federal funds rate
that is realized for the calendar month specified in the contract.
Thus, if an FOMC announcement is scheduled to take place
on day d1 of month t, the implied rate from the current-month
federal funds futures contract, ff 1, the day before is a weighted
average of the federal funds rate that has prevailed so far in
the month, r0, and the rate that is expected to prevail for the
reminder of the month, r1, plus a risk premium:
ff 1t,d1−1 = d1
D1
r0 + D1 − d1
D1
Et,d1−1r1 + ρ1t,d1−1, (5)
where D1 denotes the number of days in month t, Et,d1−1 de-
notes the mathematical expectation conditional on information
from day d1 − 1 of month t, and ρ1 denotes any risk premium
that may be present in the contract. By leading this equation
ahead one day and differencing, we can compute the surprise
component of the change in the federal funds rate target—that
is, Et,d1r1 − Et,d1−1r1. This measure, which we call mp1, is
given by
mp1t = ( ff 1t,d1 − ff 1t,d1−1) D1
D1 − d1 , (6)
which is the scaled change in the current-month federal funds
futures contract around the FOMC announcement, and is the
same as that used by Kuttner (2001). Note that to interpret (6)
as the surprise change in monetary policy expectations, we need
to assume that the change in the risk premium ρ1 in this narrow
window of time is negligible in comparison to the change in ex-
pectations itself. Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) provided some
evidence that this assumption is consistent with the data. Note
also that for FOMC meetings that occur very late in the month
(i.e., in the last seven days of the month), we use the unscaled
change in the next-month federal funds futures contract to avoid
multiplying by a very large scale factor in (6), which could un-
duly magnify changes in bid–ask spreads or other factors.
Although the policy shocks mp1 likely provide the best mea-
sure of unexpected changes to the immediate policy setting,
they might be affected by shifts in the timing of policy actions.
For example, financial markets might view a federal funds rate
tightening in the near future as very likely, but be unsure as to
whether the FOMC will act at the current meeting or the meet-
ing after. An alternative measure of monetary policy shocks that
is less affected by these timing issues can be constructed by ap-
plying a similar procedure to measure changes in expectations
about r2, the federal funds rate target that will prevail after the
second FOMC meeting from now. Let ff 2 denote the federal
funds futures rate for the month containing the second FOMC
meeting (typically the three-month-ahead contract). Then
ff 2t,d1−1 = d2
D2
Et,d1−1r1 + D2 − d2
D2
Et,d1−1r2
+ ρ2t,d1−1, (7)
where d2 and D2 are the day of that second FOMC meeting
and the number of days in the month containing that FOMC
meeting, respectively, and ρ2 denotes any risk premium in the
contract. By leading this equation ahead one day and differenc-
ing, the change in expectations for the second FOMC meeting,
which we call mp2, is given by
mp2t =
[
( ff 2t,d1 − ff 2t,d1−1) − d2
D2
mp1t
]
D2
D2 − d2 . (8)
Figure 3 compares the two shock measures mp1 and mp2 in a
scatterplot. As is clear in the figure, the two measures are gen-
erally very highly correlated with each other, lying along the
45◦ line. However, the shocks differ considerably on a handful
Figure 3. Comparison of Monetary Policy Shock Measures (mp1
vs. mp2).
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of dates, which we interpret as dates on which the FOMC’s ac-
tion was largely a surprise in timing as opposed to a surprise in
the level of the federal funds rate going forward.
To investigate this issue further, we perform a simple exer-
cise that decomposes the policy shocks into two components:
one that influences the general level of policy expectations (the
“level” factor) and one that represents shifts in the timing of
policy actions at the two meetings (the “timing” factor). For-
mally, the decomposition is as follows:[
mp1t
mp2t
]
=
[
1 1
α 0
][
levelt
timingt
]
. (9)
Note that increases in either factor, level or timing, push up the
current FOMC policy shock mp1t. An increase in level results
in a shift to the expected level of the interest rate going forward,
with the rate after the second FOMC meeting from today going
up by an amount α. By contrast, an increase in timing has no
effect on the level of the federal funds rate expected after the
subsequent FOMC meeting, but only on the timing of policy
actions across the two meetings.
We solve this decomposition based on the variance–covari-
ance matrix from the observed policy shocks, under the as-
sumption that the two factors are orthogonal. The estimated
value of α is 1.11, suggesting that the level factor is a nearly
parallel shift in the policy outlook. Both types of shocks are
sizable: The standard deviation of level shocks is 7.4 basis
points, compared to 6.6 basis points for timing shocks. The
measure mp1 is strongly influenced by these timing shocks,
which account for 44% of its variance over the sample. The
measure mp2, by construction, is not influenced at all by the
timing shocks.
Note that (9) can be inverted to yield level and timing in terms
of the observable mp1 and mp2:[
levelt
timingt
]
=
[
0 1/α
1 −1/α
][
mp1t
mp2t
]
, (10)
which, because we estimate α ≈ 1, corresponds very closely
to the “rule of thumb” definition of level and timing compo-
nents of monetary policy announcements used by Bernanke and
Kuttner (2005).
Figure 4 plots a time series of the realized values of these
two factors since 1994. One observation that stands out is that
timing shocks were more sizable early in the sample, particu-
larly in 1994 and 1995. This finding might reflect the shift in
the behavior of the FOMC beginning in 1994, when it began to
make policy moves predominantly at FOMC meetings. The re-
sults suggest that it might have taken market participants some
time to fully recognize this shift in behavior. In recent years,
some of the largest timing surprises have taken place at inter-
meeting policy moves. Indeed, two of the three sizable timing
shocks in 2001 took place on January 3 and September 17.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Three notable results emerge from this article. First, all of the
financial market instruments we consider provide forecasts of
the federal funds rate that clearly dominate standard time series
forecasts. Root mean squared errors for our financial market–
based forecasts are typically about half the size of the time se-
ries forecasts, and the R2 for funds rate changes is dramatically
higher.
Second, federal funds futures dominate other market-based
measures of monetary policy expectations at horizons out to
six months. Their predictive power for the future federal funds
rate is higher, their average risk premium is lower, and we can-
not reject the hypothesis that they encompass the information
contained in all of our other market-based forecast measures
combined.
Third, for horizons of six months to one year, term federal
funds, term eurodollars, and eurodollar futures all seem to fore-
cast about equally well. This latter finding may partly reflect the
degree to which these financial markets are integrated with one
another.
These findings have important implications for the computa-
tion of monetary policy shocks. For changes in the very near-
term stance of policy, our results support measures based on
federal funds futures. However, we presented some statistical
evidence that shocks computed from the current-month federal
funds futures contract may be influenced by changes in the tim-
ing of policy actions that do not influence the expected course
of the federal funds rate beyond a horizon of about six weeks.
We, thus, presented an alternative shock measure that captures
changes in market expectations of the course of monetary pol-
icy over slightly longer horizons, which may be more useful for
many purposes.
It is our hope that this article will serve as a reference and en-
courage the use of market-based measures of monetary policy
expectations, including in particular the use of these instru-
ments to compute monetary policy surprises around FOMC an-
nouncements and changes in market expectations for monetary
policy in response to other macroeconomic data and news re-
leases.
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APPENDIX: BAYESIAN VAR DATA, ESTIMATION, AND
FORECASTING METHODOLOGY
To compute time series forecasts of the federal funds rate in
Section 4, we use a Bayesian VAR, because these have been
found by Sims (1992) and others to provide better forecasts of
typical macroeconomic time series than standard VAR’s or uni-
variate autoregressions. In this appendix we provide the details
regarding the data, estimation, and forecasting methodology for
the BVAR we employ.
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Figure 4. Decomposition of Monetary Policy Shocks ( timing; path).
Data
We base our BVAR on three variables: the federal funds rate,
nonfarm payrolls, and the core CPI. We experimented with in-
cluding additional variables, such as a monthly gross domestic
product (GDP) series or monetary aggregates, but these never
resulted in noticeable improvements in the federal funds rate
forecasts over our 1994–2004 sample.
We begin our sample in January 1985. Many authors (e.g.,
Bernanke and Mihov 1998) have estimated one or more struc-
tural breaks in monetary policy in the early 1980s, so to reduce
the possibility of specification error we begin our estimation
after the last of these estimated breakpoints and after the end
of the Volcker disinflation of the early 1980s. We also exper-
imented with extending the estimation period back to about
1960, but this never led to noticeable improvements in the fed-
eral funds rate forecasts over the 1994–2004 period.
At the end of each month t, the federal funds rate for month t
is known, but the level of nonfarm payrolls and the core CPI is
only known for month t − 1 due to lags of a few weeks in the
release of these statistics. To make the information sets under-
lying our BVAR forecasts as comparable as possible to those
underlying our financial market forecast data, we use values of
the federal funds rate through date t and of nonfarm payrolls
and the core CPI through date t − 1 in the BVAR. Moreover,
we use the real-time vintage of these data series. Core CPI is
not revised (except on rare occasion) and, thus, is known in real
time, but we use the level of nonfarm payrolls as it was first
reported, rather than the final revised value that may not have
been computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) until
several months or even years after the fact.
Estimation
We experimented with estimating the BVAR both in lev-
els and in changes and found that the latter performed much
better for forecast horizons of six months or less. In particu-
lar, we used the month-to-month first difference of the federal
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funds rate, the year-on-year log change in the core CPI, and the
year-on-year log change in nonfarm payrolls. We used the year-
on-year change for the latter two variables because the month-
to-month changes in those series tend to be very noisy, which
would tend to bias coefficients downward.
For monthly data, we estimated the BVAR on 12 lags us-
ing a prior taken from Sims and Zha (1998) and Robertson
and Tallman (2001). In particular, we used a Normal-Flat prior
with the seven hyperparameters discussed in the Robertson–
Tallman set as follows: µ1 (overall scale) = 1, µ2 (strength
of independent random-walk prior) = .5, µ3 (strength of prior
on intercept) = 1, µ4 (decay rate on lags) = 5, µ5 (strength of
independent unit-root prior) = 5, and µ6 (strength of cointe-
gration prior) = 5. (We are indebted to Ellis Tallman for pro-
viding us with Matlab code for estimating BVARs of this type
and for helpful discussions regarding reasonable hyperparame-
ter values for our particular sample and application.) We exper-
imented with values for these hyperparameters quite a bit and
found that our forecasts and results were very robust to these
changes.
For quarterly data (Table 4) with a forecast horizon of one
to two quarters, we estimated the BVAR in first differences, as
described previously, using four lags with the seven hyperpara-
meters of the Normal-Flat prior set as follows: µ1 = 1, µ2 = 3,
µ3 = 1, µ4 = 2, µ5 = 0, and µ6 = 0. For forecast horizons
of three to four quarters, we found that a BVAR in levels per-
formed substantially better, so we estimated the BVAR in lev-
els (log levels for nonfarm payrolls and the core CPI) and set
µ1 = 1, µ2 = 5, µ3 = 1, µ4 = 1, µ5 = 0, and µ6 = 0. Note
that for quarterly data we found that the additional “unit root”
and “cointegration” hyperparameters only hurt forecast perfor-
mance relative to a more standard Minnesota-style specifica-
tion.
At each date t from January 1994 through November 2004,
we reestimate the BVAR on data running from 1985 through t,
taking account of the data availability and real-time vintage is-
sues discussed previously. Thus, our time series forecasts are
based on information that mirrors as closely as possible the in-
formation underlying our financial market data.
Finally, it is worth noting that, despite our use of real-time
data and recursive estimation, all of our BVAR forecasts have
benefited from hindsight through our choice of specification
and hyperparameter values. Thus, our BVAR forecast results
should probably be regarded as something of an ideal time
series–based forecast that would have been very difficult to ac-
tually achieve in real time. The fact that our financial market–
based forecasts still compare so favorably to the BVAR-based
forecasts is a further sign of their high quality.
Forecasting
Our forecasts are computed as one would compute forecasts
from a standard VAR. At each date t, we estimate a coeffi-
cient matrix B for the BVAR and then compute our forecasts
for xt+1, xt+2, . . . by projecting the system forward from date t,
so that x̂t+1 = Bxt, x̂t+2 = B2xt, . . . . For those forecasts that
were done in first differences for the federal funds rate, we ar-
rive back at a funds rate level forecast by cumulating the first-
difference forecasts forward.
[Received September 2004. Revised March 2006.]
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